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In late 2016, the Constitutional Court delivered judgment in a 
case, Wickham v Magistrate, Stellenbosch 2017 1 BCLR 121 
(CC), involving Wayne Anthony Wickham (an aggrieved father 
and applicant in this case), who appealed against the decision 
of the Magistrate's Court in which he was denied the opportunity 
to hand up a victim impact statement. The thrust of his 
application was that his rights, as a victim of the crime in which 
his son was negligently killed by the fourth respondent, had been 
violated, and that this raised an arguable point of law of general 
public importance. The respondents, however, argued that the 
applicant lacked standing as the dominus litis in culpable 
homicide cases is the public prosecutor, and not the relatives of 
the deceased, or the victim. The case turned on whether the 
exercise of discretion by the Magistrate in denying Wickham the 
right to be heard was performed correctly; and whether a non-
party to criminal proceedings could make an application for the 
review of the Magistrate's conduct. The article seeks to 
interrogate the rights of victims in criminal proceedings and aptly 
poses the following question: Do victims of crimes have a locus 
standi to be part of criminal proceedings? 
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1 Introduction 
In October 2016 the Constitutional Court delivered a very brief, 12-page 
unanimous judgment in the matter of Wickham v Magistrate, Stellenbosch,1 
which is a matter that started in the Magistrate's Court. The final 
determination of the matter followed a series of similar applications brought 
by Mr Wayne Anthony Wickham, whose son was killed in an auto accident 
by the negligent actions of Ms Annika Slabbert. Also cited as respondents 
in the case were the Magistrate (Stellenbosch), the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Western Cape (DPP), the Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development, as well as the convict, Ms Slabbert. In the first 
instance, Mr Wickham had instituted an original application directly to the 
Constitutional Court for leave to appeal.2 In dismissing the matter, the 
Constitutional Court held that it was not in the interests of justice to hear the 
matter at that time because the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), which had 
jurisdiction, had not yet been approached.  
Following Mr Wickham's unsuccessful Constitutional Court application, he 
approached the SCA for leave to appeal the Magistrate's decision. 
Simultaneously with this application, another application was initiated 
directly in the SCA. These two attempts were also unsuccessful. Having 
exhausted all available remedies, Mr Wickham decided to re-launch his 
application in the Constitutional Court, as an appeal against the High Court 
decision which dismissed his initial appeal against the conviction and 
sentence handed down by the Magistrate's Court. 
2 The litigation history of the current case 
The bone of contention was that the Magistrate had accepted a plea 
agreement between the DPP and Ms Slabbert “without offering Mr 
Wickham” a chance to table his victim impact statement. Mr Wickham 
claimed that he had been distressed and suffered anxiety as a result of the 
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prosecution’s and the court’s failing to give adequate regard to his concerns 
as a "parental victim of the crime".3 
Ms Slabbert had entered into a plea agreement in terms of section 105A of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA). Section 105A(1)(a) of the 
CPA provides that: 
A prosecutor authorised thereto in writing by the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and an accused who is legally represented may, before the 
accused pleads to the charge brought against him or her, negotiate and enter 
into an agreement in respect of –  
(i)  a plea of guilty by the accused to the offence charged or to an offence 
of which he or she may be convicted on the charge. 
The CPA further provides in paragraph (b) that the prosecutor may enter 
into an agreement as set out above: 
[a]fter affording the complainant …, where it is reasonable to do so and taking 
into account the nature of and circumstances relating to the offence and the 
interests of the complainant, the opportunity to make representations to the 
prosecutor regarding- 
(aa)  the contents of the agreement. 
Having accepted the plea agreement entered into in terms of the law above, 
the Magistrate's Court imposed a fine of R10 000 or 12 months' 
imprisonment which was conditionally suspended for three years. Ms 
Slabbert was also given an additional 18 months of correctional 
supervision.4 
In his appeal to the High Court, Mr Wickham sought an order setting aside 
the conviction and sentence of Ms Slabbert. Further, that the High Court 
should order a remission of the matter to the Magistrate's Court at 
Stellenbosch for a fresh hearing presided over by a different officer. The 
High Court challenge was aimed at ensuring that Mr Wickham would get his 
opportunity to introduce evidence in aggravation of sentence, which would 
include a victim impact statement. He also sought to have the DPP 
compelled to place before the court evidence in aggravation, should the 
court convict Ms Slabbert in the new trial.5 Mr Wickham's application in the 
High Court was dismissed for two reasons, namely: he lacked standing to 
have the plea and sentence agreement set aside; and the Magistrate's 
failure to exercise his discretion in terms of section 105A(7)(b)(i)(bb) of the 
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CPA on whether to hear Mr Wickham's evidence or his victim impact 
statement could not be reviewed at his instance.6 
In dealing with the first ground, being the lack of standing, the High Court 
was of the view that the obligation to afford complainants an opportunity to 
make representations falls squarely on the prosecutor. However, such an 
obligation exists only where it is reasonable to do so in the light of all the 
circumstances relating to the offence, as well as the interests of the 
complainants themselves. Failure to do this, where it would otherwise be 
reasonable to do so, is unlawful.7 
The complainant's standing under these circumstances flows from the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. In the case at hand, 
however, the High Court found that Mr Wickham had been afforded a far 
more extensive opportunity than most victims. The DPP embarked on the 
plea agreement only after hearing Mr Wickham, and as such he lacked 
standing to set aside the plea and sentence agreement.8 
On the second point regarding the reviewability of the exercise of discretion 
by the Magistrate, the High Court pointed out that victims are not party to 
criminal proceedings and as such they do not have an automatic right to 
present evidence. Mr Wickham's victim impact statement mostly discussed 
the merits of the case. What compounded his situation was that the facts he 
presented were inconsistent with the factual matrix agreed upon between 
the DPP and Ms Slabbert. In the light of the foregoing, the High Court 
concluded that the Magistrate had exercised his discretion fairly, and that 
there was no irregularity on his part. As such, his actions could not be 
subjected to review.9 
It is worth noting that the High Court did take into consideration Mr 
Wickham's feelings as a victim of Ms Slabbert's negligent behaviour.10 It 
stated that "it would have been preferable … for the Magistrate to have 
exercised some degree of judicial maturity, civility and empathy." This could 
have been done through allowing Mr Wickham some latitude to express his 
feelings at having lost his son. The court cautioned, however, that such 
indulgence could be granted only provided it did not lead to the infringement 
of the rights of Ms Slabbert.11 The Constitutional Court also endorsed the 
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7  Wickham v Magistrate para 16 
8  Wickham v Magistrate para 16. 
9  Wickham v Magistrate para 18. 
10  Wickham v Magistrate para 19. 
11  Wickham v Magistrate para 19. 
L MHLONGO & A DUBE  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  5 
High Court's view on the civility of the Magistrate, noting that "the loss of a 
child is a terrible and difficult one to bear" and as such even courts ought to 
show sympathy and respect.12 
2.1  Unsuccessful attempts to approach the Constitutional Court 
directly 
Mr Wickham's initial application to the Constitutional Court was dismissed. 
He had instituted a direct application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional 
Court, thereby bypassing the SCA, which ordinarily had jurisdiction.13 The 
Constitutional Court was of the view that doing so would not be in the 
interests of justice. The Constitutional Court has placed heavy emphasis on 
this principle over time. It has indicated that it does not want to be a court of 
first and last instance, and wants to benefit from having the issues that come 
before it being subjected to scrutiny by the subordinate courts first.  
In AParty v Minister of Home Affairs; Moloko v Minister of Home Affairs14 
the Constitutional Court stated that it needed very compelling reasons to 
depart from its ordinary procedure and to exercise its discretion to grant 
direct access. Amongst these considerations is the determination of the 
prospects of success of an application. The fact that the court is called upon 
to hear a case without the benefit of the views of other courts having 
constitutional jurisdiction is also taken into account by the court in deciding 
on an application for direct access.15 
Following the unsuccessful application for direct access to the Constitutional 
Court, Mr Wickham instituted a two-pronged application; he simultaneously 
applied for leave to appeal to the SCA via the High Court, whilst at the same 
time instituting a direct application to the SCA. He was unsuccessful in both 
applications. 
2.1.1 The case before the Constitutional Court 
Not satisfied with the SCA ruling, Mr Wickham approached the 
Constitutional Court, where he sought to overturn the decision of the court 
a quo.  
                                            
12  Wickham v Magistrate para 34. 
13  Wickham v Magistrate para 3. 
14  AParty v Minister of Home Affairs; Moloko v Minister of Home Affairs 2009 3 SA 649 
(CC) para 30. 
15  Bruce v Fleecytex Johannesburg CC 1998 2 SA 1143 (CC) para 7.  
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He sought to prove that his application raised an arguable point of law of 
general public importance. His main argument was that the High Court's 
decision set a precedent which will undermine the rights of victims as set 
out in the Victims' Charter in future criminal proceedings.16 
The Victims' Charter is a Charter of Rights adopted in terms of section 234 
of the Constitution, which empowers Parliament to adopt Charters of Rights 
consistent with the Constitution. Section 234 provides that:  
In order to deepen the culture of democracy established by the Constitution, 
Parliament may adopt Charters of Rights consistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution.  
The Victims' Charter serves as a means of protecting and promoting the 
rights of victims in compliance with South Africa's obligations under various 
international and regional human rights instruments. These include the 
United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of 
Crime and Abuse of Power, the United Nations Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
Mr Wickham argued before the Constitutional Court that the Magistrate's 
rulings, in regard to both the victim impact statement and his proposed oral 
evidence, were grossly irregular and constituted a denial of his rights as a 
victim to participate in the proceedings.17 The unanimous decision, 
however, placed emphasis on the fact that just like the rights in the Bill of 
Rights, those rights contained in section 2 of the Victims' Charter are not 
absolute.  
2.1.2  Locating the rights of victims 
Ordinarily, the rights in the Bill of Rights can be limited in two ways: by 
relying on section 36 of the Constitution, and by employing any internal 
limitation that may be contained in the specific provision under scrutiny.  
The section 2 rights of victims can be traced back to sections 34 and 16 of 
the South African Constitution, which regulate access to courts. Section 34 
stipulates that "Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be 
resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a 
court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or 
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forum". Section 16 recognises the freedom of everyone to receive and 
impart information. 
The Constitutional Court did not attempt to locate this right in the Bill of 
Rights. It simply focussed on section 2 of the Victim's Charter, and 
concluded that indeed Mr Wickham did have such a right, before proceeding 
to its limitation. Perhaps this can be attributed to the changes brought about 
by the Constitution’s Seventeenth Amendment, which broadened the scope 
of the court from "constitutional matters" to include matters that raise an 
arguable point of law of general public importance. In other words, it is no 
longer necessary for a litigant to establish that his or her case raises a 
constitutional matter, so long as the other leg is established; that is that the 
matter raises an arguable point of law of general public importance that 
ought to be decided by the Constitutional Court.18 Perhaps that is the reason 
the court no longer strives to locate a right in the Bill of Rights as it did in 
constitutional or Bill of Rights litigation cases before. For instance in Nyathi 
v MEC for Health, Gauteng, Madala J first delineated the constitutional 
issues before the court. He went on to enquire if the impugned legislation 
limited any rights in the Bill of Rights before determining whether that 
limitation was justifiable.19 All the foregoing notwithstanding, it is our view 
that section 2 of the Victim's Charter flows from sections 16 and 34 of the 
Constitution. This is further buttressed by the fact that that Victim's Charter 
itself is sanctioned by section 234 of the Constitution. 
Indeed, this resonates with the Constitutional Court's view that Mr 
Wickham's rights as a victim are to be located in the Charter, which itself 
flows from the Constitution. Hence the court noted that the introductory 
sentence to the rights in the Charter states that "the following rights, as 
contained in the Constitution and relevant legislation, will be upheld during 
your interaction with the criminal justice system". 
The limitation clause contained in section 36 provides that "The rights in the 
Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to 
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom …". The 
same provision enjoins the court to consider the following factors in 
determining whether a right has been lawfully limited or not: the nature of 
the right; the importance of the purpose of the limitation; the nature and 
                                            
18  Booysen v Minister of Safety and Security 2018 6 SA 1 (CC) para 47. 
19  Nyathi v MEC for Health, Gauteng 2008 5 SA 94 (CC) para 34.  
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extent of the limitation; the relation between the limitation and its purpose; 
and less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
Apart from section 36, rights can also be subjected to internal limitations. 
This is the case where the provision itself contains clearly defined 
parameters within which the right in question is to be enjoyed. 
It is clear from the above that the rights of victims can be limited, albeit 
through internal limitations contained within section 2 itself. The text of the 
Charter employs such terms as "where appropriate", and "if necessary and 
where possible". It also uses the discretionary word "may" in dealing with 
the right of the victim to make a statement to the court or give evidence 
during the sentencing proceedings to bring the impact of the crime to the 
court's attention. It is clear from the wording of the Charter that such rights 
are therefore not unqualified, as Mr Wickham implied. 
Section 2 of the Victim's Charter also draws its strength from section 
105A(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides that a 
prosecutor may enter into an agreement contemplated in section 105A(1)(a) 
after affording the complainant (or his representative) an opportunity to 
make representations to the prosecutor. This provision is subject to internal 
limitations too. It is thus qualified by the words "where it is reasonable to do 
so" and "taking into account the nature of and circumstances relating to the 
offence and the interests of the complainant". 
2.1.3  Standing in constitutional matters 
What can be gleaned from the judgment of the Constitutional Court is that 
the Victims' Charter does not confer standing.20 What this means is that 
applicants in the position of Mr Wickham should, over and above asserting 
their section 2 rights, also establish that the prerequisites of standing as laid 
out in section 38 of the Constitution are met. These include that the applicant 
is: 
a) acting in his own interest; 
b) acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
c) acting as a member of a group or class of persons; 
d) acting in the public interest; and 
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e) an association acting in the interests of its members. 
Mr Wickham failed to establish standing under any of the grounds listed in 
section 38. It is generally considered that own interest standing is regarded 
as weightier than that in the other categories. A person must show that a 
contested law or decision directly affects his or her interest or rights.21 In 
Ferreira v Levin22 the court held that the interests or rights protected must 
be real and not hypothetical or academic.23 The court further held that a 
hypothetical interest is one that is expressly claimed but is neither real nor 
true. For this reason, a person may be denied standing even though the 
result could be that an unlawful decision stands. 
The second and third categories of persons listed in section 38 with standing 
did not apply to Mr Wickham as he was acting on his behalf and he was also 
not a member of any group or class of persons. 
The fourth category is that the person must act in the public interest. In order 
for a person to be afforded standing with regard to this category, it must be 
shown first that the person is acting in the public interest and secondly that 
the public has sufficient interest in the requested remedy or outcome.24 The 
public interest is generally on a basis wider than those in the class actions 
as provided for in section 38(c) of the Constitution. In the Ferreira case the 
court also dealt with factors which can assist in determining whether a 
person is acting in the public interest or not. In this regard, the court held:25 
Whether there is another reasonable and effective manner in which the 
challenge can be brought; the nature of the relief sought, and the extent to 
which it is of general and prospective application; and the range of persons or 
groups who may be directly or indirectly affected by any order made by the 
court and the opportunity that those persons or groups have had to present 
evidence and argument to the court. 
Mr Wickham did not fall in this category as the remedy he sought was 
personal and did not cover any group of persons. Therefore, his argument 
that he was raising a "point of law of general public importance" could not 
stand. Mr Wickham did not fall under the last category because he was not 
an association. 
3 Determining standing in criminal matters 
                                            
21  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 80. 
22  Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 SA 984 (CC). 
23  Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) paras 160, 164-165. 
24  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 83. 
25  Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 234. 
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In Uffindell t/a Aloe Hunting Safaris v Government of Namibia, the court held 
that whether a litigant's interest in the subject matter of the litigation justifies 
the engagement of the court's judicial powers must be assessed with regard 
to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. The interest the 
litigant claims to have must not be abstract, academic, hypothetical or 
simply too remote.26 The opinion of the court in Minister of Police v NP 
Sosibo supports the view that only the state, through the office of the DPP, 
has locus standi in criminal cases, and not the victim per se.27  
The power to institute criminal proceedings as contemplated by section 179 
of the Constitution vests in the National Prosecuting Authority, which is the 
only authority empowered to institute and conduct criminal proceedings on 
behalf of the state. In other words, the prosecutor is dominus litis. The DPP 
decides whether or not to prefer charges, the nature of the charges to prefer, 
what plea to accept and on what basis, what evidence to lead and what 
sentence to suggest to the court.28  
The Constitutional Court noted that both the Magistrate and Ms Slabbert's 
attorney agreed that Mr Wickham lacked standing, and as such could not 
hand up a victim impact statement in court.29 This position was endorsed by 
the Constitutional Court as well. 
3.1 Obfuscating judicial reasoning on the issue of standing 
Standing in legal proceedings basically means that a litigant must have 
capacity to sue and also have a sufficient interest in the proceedings.30 The 
question is whether it is the same as dominus litis? 
In criminal matters the designation of the prosecutor as dominus litis means 
that he is regarded as the person in control of the criminal proceedings. He 
determines not only whether adjudication takes place, but also the charges 
to be preferred. The only exception is in the case of a private prosecution, 
where the private prosecutor is dominus litis.31 
                                            
26  Uffindell t/a Aloe Hunting Safaris v Government of Namibia 2009 NAHC 51 para 12. 
27  Minister of Police v NP Sosibo 2010 ZAKZPHC 102 (14 December 2010) para 5. It 
was held in the appeal case in which the DPP had been cited as the fourth 
respondent that the right to prosecute vests in the DPP, and only the DPP had the 
necessary locus standi to have launched the application. 
28  Wickham v Magistrate 92 and 41. 
29  Wickham v Magistrate para 12. 
30  Baxter Administrative Law 644. 
31  Kurland and Water 1959 Duke Law School Journal 493. 
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Standing, on the other hand, is not necessarily synonymous with dominus 
litis. Whilst the party considered to be dominus litis must as a matter of fact 
also have standing in a particular matter, there is no requirement that all 
parties with standing be regarded as dominus litis. A good example is where 
a litigant acts as amicus curiae, who joins the proceedings on account of his 
or her interest in the matter, without necessarily seeking to become or 
actually becoming dominus litis. The party who initiated the litigation 
remains dominus litis, even after the amicus is allowed to join the 
proceedings. 
Thus the courts' reference to the fact that the state and not the victim is 
dominus litis seems to have unfairly swayed the court towards the 
conclusion that Mr Wickham lacked standing, thereby conflating standing 
with dominus litis.32 
The Constitutional Court made a very bold statement in relation to standing 
where it held that section 2 of the Victim's Charter neither confers standing 
nor an unqualified right to give evidence or to hand up papers to a victim of 
crime.33 This implied that the issue of standing still had to be resolved using 
the parameters contained in section 38 of the Constitution, which the 
Constitutional Court regrettably did not address. 
3.1.1 Who is a victim under the Charter?  
South African law does not define what or who a victim is. The National 
Policy Guidelines for Victim Empowerment,34 however, attempts to proffer 
an explanation as to who can be classified as a victim. A victim is any person 
who has suffered harm, including physical or mental injury; emotional 
suffering; economic loss or substantial impairment of his or her fundamental 
rights, through acts or omissions that are in violation of the criminal law. This 
explanation implies that there must be a direct connection between the 
victim and the crime committed. In other words, the effects of the crime must 
primarily have affected the victim. The Guidelines continue to stipulate that 
even when a crime indirectly effects a person, such a person will qualify as 
a victim. This includes indirect victims such as the immediate family or 
dependents or even neighbours or colleagues of a direct victim. The South 
African model of ensuring justice for victims seeks to promote victim 
                                            
32  Wickham v Magistrate para 22. 
33  Wickham v Magistrate para 26. 
34  SALC Sentencing 9. 
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empowerment. It is informed by the need for a victim-centred approach to 
criminal justice, as well as the aspirations of restorative justice.35 
The Guidelines almost mirror the definition of a victim contained in the 
Australian Victim's Charter Act. The Australian Charter, in section 3, lists 
three categories of people who can claim to be victims.36 These are (a) a 
natural person who has suffered injury as a direct result of a criminal 
offence, whether or not that injury was reasonably foreseeable by the 
offender; or (b) if a person has died as a direct result of a criminal offence 
committed against that person, a family member of that person; or (c) if the 
person referred to in paragraph (a) is under 18 years of age or is incapable 
of managing his or her own affairs because of mental impairment, a family 
member of that person.  
The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 contains 
a broad understanding of the term "victim". Victims include: persons who 
individually or collectively with one or more persons suffered harm as a 
result of a gross violation of human rights; or as a result of an act associated 
with a political objective for which amnesty has been granted. Persons who 
individually or collectively with one or more persons suffered harm as a 
result of their trying to intervene and assist persons listed in the first 
category. The last category relates to relatives and dependants of victims 
as may be prescribed. 
The South African Law Commission defines a victim as a biological person 
who has suffered harm at the hands of another person in the course of a 
crime of violence.  
The South African Victims Charter embraces the definition of a victim 
contained in the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of 
Crime and Abuse of Power, which is couched as follows:37 
A person who has suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, 
emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of his or her 
fundamental rights through acts or omissions that are in violation of our 
criminal law. 'Victim' also includes, where appropriate, the immediate family 
or dependant of the direct victim. A person may be considered a victim 
regardless of whether the perpetrator is identified, apprehended, prosecuted 
or convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between the 
perpetrator and victim. 'Victim' is inclusive of all, without prejudice of any kind 
on the grounds of race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social 
                                            
35  UN ODCCP Handbook on Justice for Victims 3. 
36  Victims' Charter Act 65 of 2006. 
37  Article 1 of the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims 
of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985). 
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origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth. 
The Draft United Nations Convention on Justice and Support for Victims of 
Crime and Abuse of Power (2006) defines victims as natural persons who, 
individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental 
injury, emotional suffering or economic loss or violations of fundamental 
rights in relation to victimisations identified under "scope". The scope that 
the UN Convention envisages includes violations of criminal laws; abuses 
of power; acts of terrorism; and acts of human trafficking.38 
The African Union Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Fair and Legal 
Assistance in Africa also mirrors the definition in the Draft UN Convention 
and provides that:39 
Victim means a person or persons who individually or collectively have 
suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, 
economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through 
acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws or that do not yet 
constitute violations of national criminal laws but of internationally recognised 
norms relating to human rights. 
Mr Wickham qualified as a victim since he had a paternal relationship with 
his late son. He could thus be referred to as a relative or a family member 
of the deceased, and hence he had an interest in the outcome of the matter. 
3.2  What is a victim impact statement and what purpose does it 
serve? 
Section 2 of the South African Victims' Charter provides that the victim has 
a right to offer information during the criminal investigation and trial. It further 
requires the prosecutor to take measures to ensure that any contribution 
that the victim wishes to make is considered when deciding to prosecute. 
Further, the victim can if necessary and where applicable attend the bail 
hearing, the trial, the sentencing and the parole board hearing. Lastly, the 
victim has the opportunity to make a further statement to the police if he/she 
realises that the first statement is incomplete.  
A victim impact statement, in part, serves to empower the victim, as a part 
of the restorative justice process. The South African Law Commission views 
restorative justice as a process that seeks to redefine crime, interpreting it 
                                            
38  Articles 1 and 2 of the Draft United Nations Convention on Justice and Support for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (2006). 
39  African Union Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Fair and Legal Assistance in 
Africa (2003). 
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not so much as breaking the law or offending against the State but as an 
injury or wrong done to another person. Erez40 defines a victim impact 
statement as a statement which would "address the effects of the crime on 
the victim, in terms of the victim's perceptions and expressions of the 
emotional, physical or economic harm he or she sustained as a result of the 
crime". Apart from being therapeutic, victim impact statements also serve to 
improve sentencing outcomes and enhance the criminal justice system as 
a whole. It should be noted, however, that a victim impact statement does 
not confer judicial powers or prosecutorial powers on the victim. As such, 
the statement must refrain from dealing with the merits of the case. Thus, a 
victim impact statement should preferably not include a reference to a 
recommended sentence. The danger of doing this is that it may tend to 
tarnish or neutralise the value of the victim impact statement, should the 
recommendation be overly emotional.41 
Erez and Rogers define a victim impact statement as a written or oral 
statement made by the victim in which the victim expresses the (financial, 
social, psychological and physical) harm s/he has experienced as a part of 
the court proceedings. The growing utilisation of victim impact statements 
has caused a shift from the individualisation of the offender to the 
individualisation of the victim. This development introduced a shift from the 
conceptualisation of crime as a violation against the state and not individual 
victims. Kelly argued that this shift would remind judges, juries and 
prosecutors that behind the state is a real person with an interest in how the 
case is resolved.42 Chalmers argues that these interventions have 
therapeutic value on victims.43 Lens et al, however, while echoing the 
definition by Erez and Rogers,44 proceed to state that there is no empirical 
evidence that delivering victim impact statements gives rise to direct 
"therapeutic" effects. However, their study did reveal that feelings of anxiety 
decreased for victims who experienced higher feelings of procedural 
justice.45 They further discovered that increasing feelings of control over the 
recovery process could lead to a decrease in feelings of anger and anxiety 
amongst victims. 
In the current case, the prosecutor gave Mr Wickham the opportunity to be 
heard by requesting a victim impact statement, which he undertook to attach 
                                            
40  Erez 1995 Crim LR 545. 
41  Muller and Van der Merwe 2006 SAJHR 658. 
42  Kelly 1987 Wayne L Rev 69-86. 
43  Chalmers, Duff and Leverick 2007 Crim LR 360-379. 
44  Lens et al 2015 Eur J Criminol 19. 
45  Lens et al 2015 Eur J Criminol 31. 
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to the plea and sentencing agreement. Mr Wickham, however, prepared a 
victim statement which dealt with the merits of the case based on facts that 
were inconsistent with the factual matrix agreed upon by the state and the 
accused in the plea and sentencing agreement.46 It is because of this that 
his statement was not placed before the court. Even though the prosecutor 
later offered Mr Wickham a chance to adduce oral evidence in court before 
sentencing, the Magistrate refused to allow him that opportunity. His 
decision was influenced by information received that what purported to be 
a victim impact statement was actually a statement containing 
inconsistencies and further dealt with the merits of the case, not the impact 
of the crime on the victim. The Constitutional Court agreed that the decision 
whether or not to allow a victim to hand in an impact statement lies wholly 
within the discretion of the court.47 
4 Conclusion 
The contribution of the Wickham case to the South African criminal justice 
system is very valuable. It can be gleaned from the case that a victim of a 
crime lacks standing to challenge or review the actions of a Magistrate 
where he was denied a chance to submit a victim impact statement. Further, 
that victims are not party to criminal proceedings and as such they do not 
have an automatic right to present evidence.  
It is also apparent from the case that victim impact statements should not 
deal with the merits of the case in a manner that differs from the agreed 
facts in terms of the section 105 plea, otherwise the victim may be 
disallowed from presenting his impact statement by the court. Further, that 
the DPP, as dominus litis, enjoys the exclusive right to take the Magistrate's 
exercise of discretion on review. Finally that the discretion to allow or 
disallow the victim impact statement lies solely with the presiding officer 
and, absent any improper exercise of this discretion by the presiding officer, 
a superior court will not set his decision aside.48 
                                            
46  Wickham v Magistrate para 32. 
47  Wickham v Magistrate para 31. 
48  Wickham v Magistrate para 31. 
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